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The increased concentration of the American population in urban
areas has caused a corresponding increased concern about the appro-
priate governmental response to rapid population growth.' Many local
governments have erected legal barriers to population growth under the
authority vested in them to protect the health, safety and general wel-
fare of their communities. 2  These barriers to growth may warp migra-
tion streams by constraining the level and density of population in
affected areas.' Courts are increasingly called upon to balance the
right of local governments to control population growth against the right
of the American population to move and settle where they please.
t Social scientist for the Center for Population Research, National Institutes of
Health, Bethesda, Maryland. B.S., Loyola College; M.A., Ph.D., Duke University; 3d
year law student, University of Maryland.
:$ B.A., Mount Holyoke College; 3d year law student, University of North Caro-
lina.
1. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, THE DOMESTIC COUN-
CIL, REPORT ON NATIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CHANGING ISSUES FOR
NATIONAL GROWTH 21-35 (1976); Hodge & Hauser, The Challenge of America's Metro-
politan Population Outlook-1960 to 1985, in BUSINESS AND THE CITIEs 57 (N. Cham-
berlain ed. 1970); Holleb, The Direction of Urban Change, in AGENDA FOR THE NEW
URBAN ERA (H. Perloff ed. 1975).
2. See Gleeson, Ball, Chinn, Einsweiler, Freilich & Meagher, Urban Growth Man-
agement Systems, 309-10 A.S.P.O. PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE 3-27 (1975) [herein-
after cited as Gleeson], for descriptions of operating growth management systems in-
cluding Boca Raton, Florida; Boulder, Colorado; Brooklyn Park, Minnesota; Dade
County, Florida; Fairfax County, Virginia; Loudoun County, Virginia; Montgomery
County, Maryland; Petaluma, California; Pinellas County, Florida; Prince George's
County, Maryland; Ramapo, New York; Sacramento County, California; and Salem,
Oregon. It should be noted that equally effective legal barriers may also be imposed
by local governments whose actions lack the conscious motive or sophistication to be
labelled "urban growth management systems."
3. Local governmental growth management systems, as defined by urban plan-
ners, will not always have the effect of limiting the level or density of population; while
some systems do try to influence the rate at which population growth occurs or the total
amount of growth that will be accommodated within the jurisdiction, other systems con-
centrate on influencing the type of growth (i.e., mix of residential, commercial, and in-
dustrial), the location of development within the jurisdiction, or the design quality of
new development. D. GODSCHALK, D. BROWER, L. McBENNETT & B. VESTAL, CON-
STITUTIONAL ISSUES OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT 8-9 (1977) [hereinafter cited as GOD-
SCHALK] (soon to be published by the ASPO Press). This article is concerned only with
those growth management systems that constrain the level or cl-"ity of population with-
in their jurisdiction.
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While there has been extensive study and debate about the legal,
social and economic aspects of local growth management,4 the contro-
versy has been largely unaided by contributions from demographers
engaged in migration research. This article attempts to identify aspects
of the controversy that could reach a more satisfactory resolution if the
debate were reexamined in terms of the effects on migration patterns.
The analysis is divided into five parts. First, the types of legal
devices used to control state and local population growth are reviewed.
Most of these devices are land use controls that either directly or
indirectly affect migration. Second, the legal theories used to supervise
the application of state and local growth control laws are categorized
and described. Third, an economic and demographic interpretation of
these legal theories is proposed. Fourth, a brief discussion of the
empirical evidence germane to the legal principles is presented. Finally,
a few ways in which demographers can assist the courts are suggested.
I. LOCAL RESISTANCE TO POPULATION GROWTH
The problem of growth control often arises in jurisdictions located
in a growth corridor of an expanding metropolitan area.5 In many
cases the growth corridor is created by an improved transportation infra-
structure. The corridor could also be the result of a creeping spillover
of residential and economic development from neighboring growth
zones.6 In some jurisdictions, population growth may be sudden, and
the degree of alarm in the resident population may be great. In other
places, population growth may be more gradual. Local residents may
adopt an anti-growth attitude as they realize that the rural or environ-
mental amenities that first attracted them are being destroyed by
4. See, e.g., S. POWERS & K. CARPENTER, LEGAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS
OF GROWTH MANAGEMENT: ANNOTATED READINGS AND CASE LAW (1975); Gleeson,
supra note 2, at 115-38.
5. The use of growth controls is not confined to jurisdictions surrounding large
cities, however. In a 1975, non-random, exploratory survey, it was found that pursuit
of conscious growth management policies was fairly wide-spread. Of 191 respondents
chosen because they were believed to be engaged in growth management, 125 agencies
in 113 different cities in 33 states confirmed that they were, as a matter of policy, en-
gaged in growth management. These respondents included cities, townships, counties,
merged city/counties and regional planning agencies. While a large number were juris-
dictions close to large cities, others were free standing developed cities or counties, small
towns experiencing population booms due to new energy production, and rural commu-
nities. GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at Appendix B.
6. M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECO-
NOMIC AND GOvERNMENTAL PROCESS 50-51 (1971).
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development. 7  Or they may come to oppose growth as the existing
urban infrastructure reaches its capacity or deteriorates to such an
extent that substantial capital investments will be needed before the
jurisdiction can accommodate a population increase.8  In these and
similar situations, local governments are pressured into using whatever
powers they possess to protect the community from the real or imagined
threats to their pocketbook and life-style attendant to substantial popu-
lation growth.
Much of the litigation to date has involved attempts by small incor-
porated communities to shield themselves from migration emanating
from neighboring cities.9 Sometimes the controversy involves the net
effect of actions taken by several communities to curb the influx of new
residents, actions that may be harmless in isolation but taken together
have adverse social consequences.1" Recently, entire counties11 and
multi-county areas12 have entered the population growth control field,
and it is conceivable that state governments may take a major role in
the arena in the near future. Indeed, states may eventually be forced
to shoulder the burden of developing population policy. The Domestic
Council concluded that "there appears to be a new public, political and
academic sensitivity and appreciation for the interrelated nature of all the
factors of growth and development, [sic] More and more, various
states are recognizing policies for growth that take into account the
7. For a good discussion of one area's approach to dealing with the problem of
suburban growth pressure, see BucK's COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION, THE URBAN
FRINGE (1970).
8. See, e.g., E. FINKLER & D. PETERSON, NONGROWTH PLANNING STRATEGIES:
THE DEVELOPING POWER OF TOWNS, CITIES, AND REGIONS, 16-18, 28-29 (1974).
9. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976); Golden v. Planning.Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359,
285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Urban League v.
23 Municipalities, No. C-41, 22-73 (Middlesex County Ct., N.J., Ch. Div. 1976);
Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Cases of North-Eastern
New Jersey, in LAND USE CONTROLS: PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE REFORM 105
(D. Listokin ed. 1974).
11. See Gleeson, supra note 2, at 3-27, for descriptions of the growth management
systems in Dade County, Florida; Fairfax County, Virginia; Loudoun County, Virginia;
Montgomery County, Maryland; Pinellas County, Florida; Prince George's County,
Maryland; and Sacramento County, California.
12. See, e.g., METROPOLITAN COUNCIL [Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area],
DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK CHAPTER, METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT GUIDE (1975);
METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, A PROPOSAL FOR A METRO-
PoLITAN GROWTH POLICY PROGRAM (1975); MID-WILLAMETrE VALLEY COUNCIL OF
GOVERNMENTS, AN URBAN GROWTH POLICY FOR THE SALEM, OREGON AREA (1974).
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frequently conflicting claims of social, economic and environmental
objectives."' 3
Growth control disputes are seldom resolved in a clear, satisfying
way because there are several groups of potentially affected parties14
and a multiplicity of interests on both sides of the dispute. Growth con-
trol is often advocated to protect the physical environment, to preserve
the peaceful, uncluttered ideal of rural America and to prevent fiscal
strain on local governments.' 5 But, it may also be supported by local
residents who wish to inhibit certain socio-economic groups from
migrating to their jurisdiction.' Opponents of growth control may be
developers who see their profits diminished by the management poli-
cies.' 7  Opponents may also be lower income people or social theorists
who argue that growth control retards economic efficiency and results
in social injustice.' Often environmentalists are pitted against civil
13. COMMITrEE ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, THE DOMESTIC COUNCIL, NA-
TIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 63 (1974).
14. Five major groups affected by growth management programs have been identi-
fied as follows:
Land owner/developer-one whose interest derives from holding title or option
to property that is regulated or restricted by a growth management program
in such a way that the owner's rights to use, or derive value from, the land
are threatened.
Neighbor--one whose interest derives from owning or using land adjacent to
the property at issue and within the same jurisdiction, whose rights may be af-
fected by the use of the adjoining land.
Local resident-one whose interest derives from being a citizen of the jurisdic-
tion in which the growth management program operates, whose rights may be
affected by the public costs imposed or by the impacts on private property or
personal freedom.
Regional resident--one whose interest derives from being a citizen of a neigh-
boring community or area within the economic or geographic region, whose
rights may be affected by the impact on his community of another community's
growth management actions.
Potential resident--one whose interest derives from a desire to settle in a par-
ticular jurisdiction, whose rights may be threatened by growth management ac-
tions that limit the opportunity for migration to that jurisdiction.
GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 14.
15. See, e.g., Train, Growth with Environmental Quality, in 1 MANAGEMENT &
CONTROL OF GRowTH 42, 46 (R. Scott, D. Brower & D. Miner eds. 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Scott]; Metropolitan Council, Cost of Providing Services to Alternative Regional
Development Patterns (June 19, 1974) (Staff memorandum to Physical Development
Committee, Metropolitan Council, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.). But see Gruen, Gruen
& Associates, The Impacts of Growth: An Analytical Framework and Fiscal Example,
in 2 Scott, supra, at 512.
16. H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEVIN, IN-ZONINo: A GUIDE FOR POLICY-MAKERS
ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 37-38 (1974).
17. See, e.g., Epstein, The Current Crisis in Real Estate: A Developer's Per-
spective, in 3 Scott, supra note 15, at 479; Searles, Is Growth Good? An Industry
Perspective, in id. at 497.
18. See, e.g., H. FRANKLIN, CONTROLLING URBAN GROWTH-BUT FOR WHOM?
(1973); Agelasto, No Growth and the Poor: Equity Considerations in Controlled
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rights advocates. It is the kind of controversy in which responsible per-
sons can argue for either side, and resolution of the conflicting interests
is difficult, if not impossible.
There are many tools available for controlling population growth.
A 1975 survey of 105 local (non-regional) agencies engaged in growth
management found that over half of the agencies were using or
intended to use the following tools:1 9
1. Public Acquisition of Land
a. Fee-simple acquisition
b. Less than fee-simple acquisition
2. Public Improvements
a. Requirements for adequate off-site facilities for new
development
b. Location of facilities to influence growth location
20
c. Capital programming to influence growth timing
d. Control of access to existing facilities
3. Environmental Controls
a. Standards for special areas (e.g., flood plains)
b. Designation of critical environmental areas"'
c. Pollution control standards
d. Environmental impact statements
e. Designation of developments of regional impact22
Growth Policies, 9 PLANNING COMMENT 2 (1973); Alonso, Urban Zero Population
Growth, DAEDALUS, Fall, 1973, at 191, 194; Finkler, Nongrowth as a Planning Alterna-
tive: A Preliminary Examination of an Emergency Issue, 283 A.S.P.O. PLANNING AD-
VIsoRY SERVICE 4, 4 (1974); Johnson, Should the Poor Buy No Growth?, in THE No-
GROWTH SocIETY 165 (M. Olson ed. 1973); Stahl, "Cost Repercussions" of the No-
Growth Movement, URAN LAND, Dec. 1973, at 17; Thompson, Problems That Sprout
in the Shadow of No-Growth, A.I.A.J., Dec. 1973, at 30.
19. GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 12-13.
20. This allows the developer to build only if adequate public facilities will be
available to meet the demands generated by the development. It may consider off-site
facilities such as police and fire protection, schools, parks, water and sewer systems, and
transportation systems. If combined with a capital improvements program staging the
provision of off-site facilities, it may regulate the timing of development. Id. at Appen-
dix C. See also Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law to Bind the Rights
of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234, 242-45 (1973).
21. Critical environmental areas or areas of environmental concern are natural
areas of environmental importance that are regulated by strict development controls be-
cause of the sensitive nature of the environmental system. GODSCHALK, supra note 3,
at Appendix C.
22. Designating developments of regional impact is a technique that requires a de-
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4. Zoning Techniques
a. Conventional zoning





e. Special permit zoning
f. Exclusive agricultural or non-residential zoning
g. Conditional zoning"
h. Performance standard zoning
26
5. Subdivision Techniques
a. Conventional subdivision regulations
b. Mandatory dedication of land or capital facilities
c. Money in lieu of land or capital facilities
6. Tax and Fee Systems
a. Preferential taxation (e.g., agricultural land)
b. Special assessment
c. Development district (special taxing district)
7. Other Controls on the Land
a. Official map
b. Restrictive covenants
velopment permit from a local government if the nature or magnitude of the develop-
ment is likely to result in significant impacts beyond the local government's jurisdiction.
Id. See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Pro-
posed Official Draft, 1975).
23. Planned unit development is a provision whereby land development larger than
a stated minimum size may be planned, reviewed and approved as a unit. It usually
allows planners and developers to bargain over densities, cluster patterns, amenities and
similar specifics, thus permitting greater flexibility than conventional zoning. GOD-
SCHALK, supra note 3, at Appendix C. See also Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid to Ram-
apo: New Directions in Land Development Controls, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 56, 85-87
(1973).
24. Flexible zoning is a regulation that allows for variation in location and density
of development on specific parcels as long as the entire development project does not
exceed an overall density. GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at Appendix C.
25. Conditional zoning is a technique in which the land owner offers to restrict
his use of the property in some way in order to obtain a favorable rezoning decision
from the zoning authority. Id..
26. Performance standard zoning is land use control by specification of standards
that must be met rather than by limitation according to use and density as is done in
conventional zoning. Id.
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Other tools that were less widely used, but often more controversial,
include bonus zoning,27 transfer of development rights,28 exclusion of
multi-family housing, low or moderate income housing requirements, 29
development limit line, population/employment targets, regional fair
share allocations (e.g., of low and moderate income housing), total
population limits, and temporary restraints through water, sewer or
building permit moratoria.30
It should be noted that a few of these techniques may involve
purely private arrangements. Other tools utilize public sector incen-
tives or disincentives to guide private decisions. Finally, other tech-
niques involve direct regulation of private actions by the local govern-
ment; these techniques rely primarily on the local government's police
power to regulate, but also make use of the locality's power to spend
(e.g., to provide services and facilities), power to acquire (e.g., to buy
property rights in fee or less than fee for open space or conservation
easements) and power to tax. Growth management policies are
usually implemented through combinations of the above tools and
techniques.
Most growth management policies concentrate on influencing the
amount of residential housing in the community. Restrictions on
housing may be implemented either directly or indirectly. Direct
restrictions limit the number and type of housing units that can be built
27. A technique used in conjunction with conventional or performance zoning in
which the municipality allows the developer to exceed the limitations (e.g., density or
height restrictions) in some profitable way in exchange for the developer providing addi-
tional amenities. Id. See also Elliott & Marcus, supra note 23, at 61-72.
28. One definition of transfer of development rights is:
A transaction in which the unused rights to develop, belonging to one parcel,
are separated from that parcel and transferred (usually sold) to another parcel
which can then be developed more intensely than was previously allowed.
Usually transferor and transferee sites are designated by district or characteris-
tics .... The parcel from which the development rights have been removed
cannot be developed to a greater intensity, and this restriction of only being
able to develop to the extent of the retained development rights becomes a per-
manent legal encumberance [sic] on the land.
GODScHALK, supra note 3, at Appendix C.
29. This technique requires the developer to provide housing that will be affordable
by lower income people, usually as a certain percentage of the total number of units
developed. Usually this requirement applies only to larger developments, requires only
a small proportion to be for low or moderate income people and is tied to the availabil-
ity of federal housing subsidies or allowability of increasing densities in order to make
it economically feasible. Id. See also H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A. LEvIN, supra note
16, at 131-40.
30. GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at Appendix B. See also Gleeson, supra note 2, at
35-48, for a discussion of 55 growth management techniques.
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in an area and thereby influence the number and socio-economic char-
acteristics of future residents, many of whom will be migrants. Ex-
amples of direct restrictions include zoning, population caps and
moratoria on building permits. Indirect restrictions work through the
price mechanism and, in effect, raise housing prices to discourage
potential residents from moving into an area. Subdivision regulations
are a good example of a technique that allows a local government to
force a developer to include the cost of roads, sidewalks, sewer and
water systems, recreation facilities, and set-asides for public facilities in
the price of housing. By requiring elaborate facilities, the price of
housing can be increased by many thousands of dollars.8' Most of the
tools listed above can be manipulated to increase the price of housing
and thus retard population growth.8 2
Direct restrictions have been the ones most frequently attacked in
the courts, perhaps because they are more visible and their impact on
affected parties is easier to prove,83 whereas indirect restrictions are
less visible and their impacts are intermingled with the normal workings
of the economic system. However, indirect restrictions are no less
important than direct restrictions in affecting potential residents and
manipulating migration patterns. A few recent cases 'have been
brought by plaintiffs who wanted courts to scrutinize these indirect
effects, but judicial analysis to date has been rather unsophisticated. 84
II. LEGAL THEORIES AFFECTING MIGRATION
Although judicial response to challenged growth management
programs is in an unsettled state and may vary substantially among
courts, it is possible to make some generalizations about theories avail-
able to challengers. Some theories upon which plaintiffs may attack
31. It is not being suggested that all subdivision requirements are necessarily bad
because they raise housing prices. Some of the requirements are justifiable in terms of
being necessary to a minimum quality of life. Other requirements, however, seem to
have only marginal relation to the health and safety of the inhabitants.
32. See B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WrrnouT ZONING (1972).
33. See, e.g., cases cited in Gleeson, supra note 2, at 138-41. Cf. Jacobsen & Red-
ding, Impact Taxes: Making Development Pay Its Way, 55 N.C.L. REv. 407 (1977)
(judicial treatment of one regulatory device).
34. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), in which the Court suggested
that the exclusionary effects of Penfield's zoning ordinance, which allowed only 0.3%
of the land available for residential construction to be used for multifamily structures
and made lower cost housing economically unfeasible because of density and other
amenity requirements, could be attributed to the economics of the area housing market
rather than any illegal acts. Id. at 506.
[Vol. 55
LOCAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT
local growth management programs are only indirectly related to
migration patterns; judicial cognizance of the claims may have an effect
on migration patterns, but the alleged violation is not premised on harm
to potential residents. Litigation on the theories of taking of land,
3 5
violation of equal protection as between two similarly situated pieces
of land,36 and violation of environmental protection standards as a result
of local growth management policiess7 are examples of indirect chal-
lenges.
Several legal theories may, however, be available to plaintiffs who
want directly to question the permissible impact of growth management
programs on migration patterns and rights of potential residents. In
state courts, plaintiffs may be able to proceed on theories of regional
general welfare or racial or economic equal protection. In federal
courts, a modified regional welfare theory, the right to travel, racial
equal protection or statutory grounds such as those created by the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 may be included
in plaintiff's arsenal. Btit access to theories for direct attack does not
guarantee potential residents the right to move where they please.
There are many restrictions on conditions under which each theory may
be used, and there is some question which courts will be responsive to
which theory. Even when a plaintiff prevails, the remedy may be so
partial, mechanical or artificial as to deprive potential migrants of
35. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3544 (U.S. March 30, 1976) (downzoning);
Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94
Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971) (fiscal impact); Robinson v. City
of Boulder, - Colo. -, 547 P.2d 228 (1976) (non-extension of public facilities);
Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dis-
missed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972) (timed development over eighteen years); Board of Super-
visors v. DeGroff Enterprises, 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973) (mandatory inclu-
sion of lower cost housing); F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISsUE
(1973); GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 53-64; THE POTOMAC INsTITUTE, LOCAL GROWTH
MANAGEMENT POLICY: A LEGAL PRIMER, 29-31 (1975); Gleeson, supra note 2, at 62-
66.
36. See, e.g., City of Greeley v. Ells, 186 Colo. 352, 527 P.2d 538 (1974) (no
discrimination between similarly situated property); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d
359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972)
(phased provision of services); Board of Supervisors v. Williams, 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d
33 (1975) (discrimination found between similarly situated property); Citizens for Un-
derground Equality v. City of Seattle, 6 Wash. App. 338, 492 P.2d 1071 (1972)
(geographic discrepancy in services); GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 177-91; Gleeson,
supra note 2, at 69-70.
37. See, e.g., Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation &
Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 105-112; Gleeson,
supra note 2, at 109-14.
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meaningful relief. Judicial response to each of these theories will be.
examined to determine the magnitude of burden localities may impose
on potential migrants in order to manage growth and the effectiveness
of the remedy if the court finds the actual burden to be excessive.
A. Range of Judicial Interpretation
In order to understand the range of judicial interpretation from
state to state, it is helpful to place the states within a generalized frame-
work. Norman Williams has designed a helpful typology of judicial
response to land use controls, based on his study of over ten thousand
land use and zoning cases.88
Williams identifies four periods in American land use controls.
The first, "pre-zoning," was typified by a lack of acceptance of zoning,
reliance on the nuisance doctrine and total exclusion of certain
objectionable uses.39 This is no longer the prevailing view in any
state.40
The second stage, "acceptance of the zoning principle," was
reached by most state courts in the late 1920's when they held that
private land could have broad restrictions placed on its use without the
payment of compensation and that the uses of land could be arranged
into districts. 41 The burden of proof was generally on the local govern-
ment to prove why a certain restriction should be enforced. Most of
the states have passed beyond this stage as well. 42
"Faith in local autonomy," identified as the third stage, is the
current rule in most states. Courts in this stage accord great respect
to zoning and land use decisions made by local agencies. 48  It is
characterized by a strong presumption of validity of government actions,
a rule that zoning is valid as long as the case is fairly debatable and
a belief in the propriety of local definitions of the general welfare.
Williams cited a built-in bias toward fiscal zoning and exclusionary zon-
ing as a shortcoming of this approach and observed that permitting this
38. 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMEmCAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER
§§ 5.01-.06 (1974).
39. Id. § 5.02.
40. Id.
41. Id. § 5.03.
42. Id. Williams comments that "Illinois is still clearly (and happily) resting there.
Michigan has wavered back and forth . . . . New York clearly reverted to this stage
during the Keating period. If Ohio and Rhode Island are out of this stage, they are
only barely so." Id. § 5.03, at 105.
43. Id. § 5.04.
430 [Vol. 55
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bias to operate results in preventing the migration of large groups of
people into areas where better housing, improved employment oppor-
tunities and good public services exist.
4"
A fourth stage, "sophisticated judicial review," is beginning to
emerge and is described by Williams as "still more an attitude than a
body of coherent doctrine . . ." It represents the "revival of
creative judicial review, as an active force to protect really basic values
... . "4 Among the characteristics are increased judicial scrutiny of
the relationship of means to ends; increased concern about exclusionary
zoning, with an indication that the presumption of validity might be
reversed when regulations exclude uses with high social value, particu-
larly lower income housing; increased review of the policy background
for restrictions, accompanied by some deference to regulations imposed
pursuant to a comprehensive plan and increased concern over what
weight to give environmental factors. New Jersey is an example of a
state that has reached this fourth stage.
Williams foresees a major turning point ahead with the third
period, municipal autonomy, ending.47  States may return to some
variation of stage two, thereby strengthening the position of developers
in land use decisionmaking. Or states may move forward to the fourth
stage, thereby encouraging probing judicial review to protect basic
values particularly as they affect "third party nonbeneficiaries." While
in the future some states may revert to stage two, potential migrants
currently challenging growth management programs will probably con-
front courts embracing the third or fourth stage approach.
B. State Courts, Potential Migrants and the Regional General Welfare
Challenge
In state courts adopting the "local autonomy" stage of analysis, there
appears to be no specialized theory on which potential migrants can
challenge a restrictive growth management policy. Even if they get
standing to challenge on a general due process or exclusionary zoning
theory, courts are not likely to be very receptive to their claims. State
courts often view the major responsibility of local government as the
44. Id. He cites California, New Jersey before 1973, Massachusetts, and Maryland
as good examples of states at this stage.
45. Id. § 5.05, at 107. New Jersey is an example of a state that has reached this
fourth stage. See text accompanying notes 67-83 infra.
46. 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, § 5.05, at 110.
47. Id. § 5.06.
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enhancement of the well-being of local residents without regard to the
effect on regional residents or potential migrants.4  However, in some
states embracing variations of the second or fourth stage-acceptance
of the zoning principle or sophisticated judicial review-a legal theory
has emerged that provides a way for potential residents to challenge
negative impacts of local growth management systems.4" This theory
is regional general welfare."
Regional general welfare challenges have been based on statutory
interpretation of state planning enabling legislation and state constitu-
tional due process provisions. The theory is premised on the fact that
state due process clauses require that local governments only exercise
their regulatory powers to further the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the community.51 The theory assumes that the police power
is delegated to localities with the understanding that it will be used to
further the interests of the state as a whole; the theory further postu-
lates that the aggregate of actions intended to enhance regional welfare
is better for the state welfare than the aggregate of actions intended
to enhance the welfare of individual localities and that, therefore, en-
hancement of regional welfare is the appropriate standard for evaluat-
ing any growth management control. 2
48. Writing when most of the state courts were at the local autonomy stage, Bos-
selman expressed his disapproval of this traditional state approach. While his concern
was not based on migration alone, it was based on the negative consequences he foresaw
in allowing local governments to time growth with disregard for regional impacts:
Local government's assertion of the power to undertake development tim-
ing might be at least partly beneficial if any of three conditions existed: an
effective system of regional planning, an extensive program of land banking,
or detailed judicial scrutiny of the effects of development timing. None of
these now exists. Consequently, authorizing local governments to exercise de-
velopment timing power might be analogized to giving dynamite to a baby. It
is a risky business, but at least it induces the parents to watch the child more
closely.
Bosselman, supra note 20, at 265.
49. These states are New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania. Michigan has been
in this category by virtue of lower court decisions, but the Michigan Supreme Court has
recently rejected the regional general welfare approach. See text accompanying notes
59-60 infra.
50. See generally GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 65; THE POTOMAC INSTITUTE, supra
note 35, at 21.
51. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), established this inter-
pretation of the federal due process clause. This meaning is usually accepted as also
being required by their state due process clause in those 44 to 46 states with equivalent
constitutional provisions. 1 P. NICHOLs, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.1 (rev. 3d
ed. 1973).
52. H. FRANKLIN, supra note 18, at 20-22. An alternative theory provides that
even if one could not prove that there is an explicit directive that the police power only
be used to enhance the welfare of the state as a whole, arguably this limitation would
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Pennsylvania courts were the first to imply that a regional need
for residential development took precedence over a local desire to limit
growth. In a 1965 case5" the court invalidated a four acre minimum
lot size requirement citing the chaos and hardship that would be experi-
enced if all townships in the area adopted similar zoning restrictions.
The court stated that zoning "must not and cannot be used by those
officials as an instrument by which they may shirk their responsibilities.
. . . Zoning provisions may not be used . . . to avoid the increased
responsibilities and economic burdens which time and natural growth
invariably bring."' 54 While this appears to be a good start toward recon-
ciling the interests of potential migrants to the region with those of local
government, subsequent judicial developments in Pennsylvania have
not contributed significantly to analysis of this conflict.55 A decision
requiring townships to zone at least one area for new multi-family
dwellings has been expanded to require that each locality provide areas
for a whole host of residential building types. 56 No standards have
been established for the amount of "natural growth" a community must
accept, and no attempt has been made to analyfe the socio-economic
impacts of such land use controls.57  This mechanical standard of
requiring zoning for a wide range of residential building types demands
accommodation of new residents without distinguishing among com-
munity types, without analyzing migration patterns or labor markets and
without measuring the degree to which a locality has already accommo-
dated regional growth.5 8 The Pennsylvania approach, while accepting
a regional standard, appears to have the shortcomings typical of the
second stage of judicial review. It tends to favor developers' interests
in a mechanical manner without balancing those interests or invoking
a level of judicial scrutiny necessary to the protection of basic values.
For a few years the Michigan lower courts followed a similar
regional analysis emphasizing the accommodation of particular uses.
have to be implied since the state could -not constitutionally delegate its power to be used
in ways harmful to the state even if it desired to do so. Id. at 22.
53. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
54. Id. at 527-28, 215 A.2d at 610.
55. But see Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341
A.2d 466 (1975), in which the court cited the New Jersey regional welfare cases and
adopted a fair share approach. See text accompanying notes 67-83 infra. The effect
this will have on the mechanical Pennsylvania standard remains to be seen.
56. Compare Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), with Appeal
of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
57. 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at § 66.26.
58. Williams, Doughty & Potter, The Strategy on Exclusionary Zoning: Towards
What Rationale and What Remedy, 1972 LAND USE CONT. ANN. 177, 199-201.
1977] 433
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
They held that upon a finding that a particular land use substantially
advanced the regional public interest and was appropriate for a given
site, the burden shifted to the locality to justify its exclusion of that
use.59 This formulation was rejected by the Michigan Supreme Court
when it replaced the regional welfare test with a test of total exclusion.:0
It is clear that neither of these state courts reached its decision
through a careful balancing of the rights of regional and potential resi-
dents against the interests of local governments.,' The decisions of the
courts of New York and New Jersey appear to be more informed of
these concerns, qualifying these states as having achieved the fourth
stage of judicial review. The first important regional welfare case in
New York is Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo." In
a challenge to a growth management system that timed development
by staging the provision of facilities and requiring adequate facilities as
a condition precedent to granting a building permit,63 plaintiffs
alleged that the system enhanced the welfare of the locality to the detri-
ment of the rest of the region. The court accepted the regional stand-
ard as the appropriate one, but upheld the local growth controls on the
basis that the plan evidenced sufficient concern for future population
assimilation. 4 The judicial scrutiny was limited, however, since the
court looked to the language of the ordinance rather than the projected
impact of the restrictions. Further, the court was reluctant to invalidate
the system because no other body was prepared to take over growth
management on a regional basis. 5
Although the New York court did not engage in full judicial
scrutiny in its first case, New Jersey courts extended judicial review
59. Green v. Township of Lima, 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972);
Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971); Comment.
The Michigan Preferred Use Doctrine as a Strategy for Regional Low-Income Housing
Development: A Progress Report, 8 URB. L. ANN. 207 (1974).
60. Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
61. In fact, one commentator wrote with reference to Pennsylvania: "the specific
rationale can only be described as laughable (no exclusion of billboards, and no exclu-
sion of lighted signs, or of quarries-and so not of apartments either!)" 3 N. WILLIAMS,
supra note 38, § 66.26, at 74.
62. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1003 (1972). But note the later evolution of the New York standard in Berenson v.
Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
63. For the text of the zoning amendment creating the growth management system,
see 2 Scott, supra note 15, at 7-13.
64. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 376, 285 N.E.2d 291, 300-01, 334
N.Y.S.2d 138, 150, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
65. For a critique of the limited judicial scrutiny, see, e.g., H. FRANKLIN, supra note
18, at 26; Bosselman, supra note 20, at 253.
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much further. The New Jersey courts also developed a notion of
affirmative action by localities-a requirement that they actually pro-
mote regional welfare.0 6 This was in marked contrast to the Pennsyl-
vania, Michigan and New York formulations that merely required a
passive "open door" policy to avoid harming the regional welfare.
In the first New Jersey case, Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Town-
ship of Madison,17 the superior court invalidated a zoning ordinance for
failing ,to promote a balanced community in accordance with the
general welfare.6 8  In its analysis the court defined the region as "the
area from which, in view of available employment and transportation,
the population of the township would be drawn, absent invalid exclu-
sionary zoning." 69  In devising a remedy, however, the court merely
employed a quota system using the township, not the region as the base;
it held that the township must maintain the same proportion of low-
income housing as existed at that time.70
In a similar case, Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Town-
ship of Mount Laurel,71 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a zon-
ing ordinance that fails to meet the housing needs of residents of all
incomes living within the region does not serve the general welfare and
is invalid. Specifically, it held:
We conclude that every such municipality must, by its land use
regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropri-
ate variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presump-
tively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of people
mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in its regula-
tions must affirmatively afford that opportuity, at least to the
extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and prospec-
tive regional need therefor.
72
This fair share requirement would be modified for community type
3
66. Scott, Beyond 'sic Utere . . .' to the Regional General Welfare, 27 ZONING
Di. 6 (1975).
67. 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971), cert. granted,
62 N.J. 185, 299 A.2d 720 (1972). Madison Township amended its ordinance before
the Supreme Court's resolution and the case was tried again on remand and reported
at 128 N.J. Super. 438, 320 A.2d 223 (Super. Ct. Law Div.- 1974). On appeal to the
New Jersey Supreme Court, this case is still undecided after its fourth hearing.
68. 117 N.J. Super. at 21, 283 A.2d at 358.
69. 128 N.J. Super. at 441, 320 A.2d at 224.
70. Id. at 447, 320 A.2d at 227.
71. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
72. Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724.
73. The fair share requirement applies only to "developing communities"; those
that are already predominantly developed and those experiencing no development pres-
sures are excluded. Id. at 180, 336 A.2d at 728. For an application of this doctrine
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and substantial environmental threat.7 4 While fiscal reasons would
probably not be sufficient to avoid accommodation of one's fair share
of regional growth, Mount Laurel indicated that growth restriction tech-
niques that allocate the fiscal burden of development, such as the
scheme used in Ramapo, might be approved if they provided for a mix
of building types and income groups at an early stage .7  Additionally,
the judicially created fair share standard was to defer to a binding hous-
ing allocation agreement among all municipalities in the region.70
Beyond these qualifications, Mount Laurel left the fair share
requirement rather vague. The region was to be determined according
to local conditions but limited to one state.77 In the case of the town-
ship of Mount Laurel, the region was defined as a semicircle of a par-
ticular radius. The amount of the fair share was to be determined by
the municipal, county and state planning bodies. The court indicated
that the housing needs of low and moderate income people presently
or formerly residing in substandard dwellings and the housing needs of
people presently or reasonably expected to be employed in the town-
ship should be considered.7"
While the particular definition of the Mount Laurel region appears
to be fairly arbitrary, the court, in leaving formulation of fair share to
planners, provided the opportunity for 'the fair share allocation to be
sensitive to important factors such as housing markets, labor patterns
and social interaction. In a subsequent lower court decision, however,
a court attempted mechanically to apply the fair share standard with
numerical precision without the assistance of planners. In Urban
League of Greater New Brunswick v. 23 Municipalities,"0 Middlesex
County, a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), was desig-
nated as the apposite region, primarily based on political boundaries
and the availability of data rather than considerations of housing
markets or employment patterns.8 0  After dismissing complaints
against twelve municipalities because of exemptions provided in Mount
Laurel, the court analyzed the remaining eleven municipalities with
by a lower court in a subsequent decision, see Segal Const. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
ment, 134 N.J. Super. 421, 341 A.2d 667 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
74. 67 N.J. at 186, 336 A.2d at 731.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 188-89, 336 A.2d at 732-33.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. - N.J. Super. -, 359 A.2d 526 (Middlesex County Ct., Ch. Div. 1976).
80. Id. at 531-32.
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regard to percentage of low and moderate income resident families,
number of industrial employees, and vacant acreage suitable for hous-
ing. A ten year county-wide low and moderate income housing need
was projected, motivated by a desire to maintain the same ratio of
county resident employees of low and moderate income.s- As a first
step, units were allocated to municipalities to bring them even with the
county-wide proportion of low and moderate income families.8 2 The
remaining unallocated units were then apportioned among the eleven
municipalities equally. 83 Whether this interpretation of the fair share
requirement will be sustained by the New Jersey Supreme Court
remains a question.
New York has recently followed New Jersey into the fair share
formulation. In Berenson v. Town of New Castle,"4 the court held that
a locality may prohibit multi-family housing only if regional and local
needs for such housing are supplied in that locality or in other
accessible areas in the region. The precise methodology that will be
used in this determination is not yet defined.
As a major specialized state based challenge available to potential
migrants,85 the regional general welfare theory does have the capacity
to force localities to recognize and provide for the needs of migrants.
It is only accepted as a legitimate claim, however, in a small number
of leading states. Furthermore, where a region is multi-state, the
theory appears to be restricted to that part of the region lying within
one state. Additionally, it may concentrate on keeping current patterns
of housing segregation from intensifying, rather than on promoting
increased socio-economic integration. Finally, it runs the risk of
degenerating into an arbitrary process that manipulates numbers and
81. Id. at "541.
82. Id.
83. The balance of 14,667 units was divided by 11, allocating 1,333 units per mu-
nicipality. Id. at 542.
84. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
85. Another theory that may be of use to migrants that may be found only in state
constitutions is equal protection based on wealth. There is some indication that the
New Jersey court may prohibit economic discrimination in some situations related to
growth management. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
Additionally, the state courts may be important to potential migrants to the extent
that the proof they require of racial discrimination under the state constitution is less
rigorous than the proof required to prove a violation of the federal equal protection
clause. See discussion of the federal standard of proof in text accompanying notes 122-
141 infra.
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forgets about the basic general welfare values the judiciary set out to
protect.
C. Federal Courts and Potential Migrants: Regional General
Welfare, the Right To Travel, Racial Equal Protection and the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974
Federal courts, in reviewing challenges to land use controls based
on the Federal Constitution or federal statutes, tend to use the third
stage of judicial review. 86  The Supreme Court has held that local
police power should be given a broad scope87 and has sustained the valid-
ity of municipal zoning entirely for single family housing 8S In conform-
ance with this position, lower federal courts have held preservation
of a town's rural environment to be a legitimate objective of zoning.8 9
To their general support for local autonomy, limited judicial
scrutiny and apparent lack of concern for potential migrants, the Court
has recently added another major hurdle for potential residents-a
more demanding standing requirement ° In Warth v. Seldin,91 plain-
tiffs included individuals who wanted to move into Penfield, a suburb
of Rochester, New York. The Court denied them standing, stating that
they had to allege facts demonstrating that the challenged practice (a
zoning ordinance and its enforcement) harmed them personally, that
they personally would benefit from judicial intervention or that they
had a present interest in property in the defendant municipality. The
present interest did not have to be ownership of land or a contractual
interest in a project, but by implication, the interest had to be as con-
crete as the desire and ability to move into a particular proposed
development currently precluded by the challenged practice. 2
86. 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, § 66.34, at 101.
87. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), in which the Court wrote:
"It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled." Id. at 33.
88. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). The Court held the po.
lice power "ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings
of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." Id. at 9. This
may be distinguishable from other growth management cases because of the small size
of the municipality, approximately 700 people.
89. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir.
1974). See also 1 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, at § 7.05,
90. There is room for debate over whether this is a new standard or merely artic-
ulates a previous policy regarding the need for potential residents to join with developers
in order to bring suit. See GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 39-40; Moskowitz, Standing
of Future Residents in Exclusionary Zoning Cases, 6 AKRON L. REV. 189 (1973).
91. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
92. See id. at 508 n.18.
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The effect of Warth is to limit migrants' challenges to growth
management policies on federal constitutional theories to a project by
project attack; challenges to whole municipalities or regions are pre-
cluded.93 This prevents potential migrants from bringing the type of
suit that would be most effective. 4 Despite these basic restrictions,
some lines of attack have emerged that may be of limited assistance
to those who wish to challenge local growth controls in federal courts.
First, federal courts have shown some willingness -to invoke due
process to require consideration of regional welfare in housing litiga-
tion. Unlike leading state courts, however, federal courts have usually
interpreted regional welfare to require a locality to accept growth or
accommodate lower cost housing only if there is no other alternative
site in the whole region.95 Due to overwhelming problems of proof,
this standard usually results in upholding local restrictions.9 6  Clearly,
this is a much weaker standard than the ones used in Pennsylvania,
New Jersey and New York, since it is applied only on a single project
basis and since it is successful only when plaintiff can prove that harm
t6 the regional welfare would be the inevitable result. While there are
some signs that federal courts may broaden their regional perspective,
9 7
it is probable that potential migrants will have to invoke other theories
in order to obtain judicial relief.
One theory potential residents might invoke instead of the regional
general welfare is the right to travel.18  As it has been applied, the right
to travel includes the right of transient passage between states as well
as the right to migrate to settle in another state. It has not been estab-
lished by the Court whether the right to travel applies equally to
93. Compare this to the strategy used in Urban League v. 23 Municipalities,
N.J. Super. -, 359 A.2d 526 (Middlesex County Ct., Ch. Div. 1976).
94. See 3 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 38, § 66.36, at 106-07 for a description of the
most effective lawsuit to challenge exclusionary land use controls. It includes bringing
suit against a whole county or.group-of municipalities.
95. Bosselman, Growth Management and Constitutional Rights-Part h. The
Blessings of Quiet Seclusion, 8 URB. L. ANN. 3, 22 (1974).
96. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974)
(exclusion of lower income residents upheld on the ground that ample housing opportu-
nities were available elsewhere in the region); Acevedo v. Nassau County, 369 F. Supp.
1384 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (refusal to allow construction of multifamily housing upheld on
theory that land was available elsewhere in county).
97. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1539 (1976), in which the Court held
that it was permissible to order inter-district (or regional) relief for discrimination even
when the violation was not inter-district since that was the only way that relief would
be possible.
98. See generally Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application to Restrictive
Housing Laws, 66 Nw. U.L. RPv. 635 (1971); Comment, The Right to Travel: Another
Constitutional Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. CH. L. REv. 612
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interstate and intrastate movement. s3 Some commentators believe that
this distinction is not crucial in the area of land use controls because re-
strictions that tend to affect intrastate migration also affect interstate mi-
gration.10° Others cite the interstate/intrastate distinction as the major
determinant of whether the right to travel is pertinent in growth
management litigation; they contend that if the right to travel goes only
to interstate travel, plaintiffs will have the heavy burden of proving that
the challenged local control restricted movement into the state.1 1
Infringement of this fundamental right of interstate travel would be
justified only by a compelling state interest. When there is no proof of
a negative impact on interstate migration, plaintiffs would have to show
that the local controls were unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious in
order to invalidate them.
Which interpretation will ultimately be accepted by the courts may
depend on the source to which the court attributes the right to travel.
Early cases grounded the right to travel in the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution. 1 2 Subsequent
cases have attributed the right to travel, instead, to the privileges and
immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, 03 the commerce
clause, 04 the due process clause of the fifth amendent, 0 5 the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment'06 and the Constitu-
tion generally.10
7
Arguably, only if a court accepts the equal protection clause as the
basis of the right to travel and views the right to move intrastate as well
as interstate as a fundamental precept of personal liberty would a local
regulation that burdened only intrastate migration be subject to strict
(1972); Comment, The Right to Travel-Its Protection and Application Under the Con.
stitution, 40 U.M.K.C. L. Rv. 66 (1971).
99. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974). But see
King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
863 (1971); Cole v. Housing Auth., 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970), in which lower fed-
eral courts held the right to travel extended to intrastate movement.
100. GODSCHALK, supra note 3, at 101-02.
101. Gleeson, supra note 2, at 71.
102. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1871); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168 (1868); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No.
3230).
103. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
104. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 282 (1849).
105. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
106. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
107. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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scrutiny.1 08  Other sources of the right to travel would allow courts to
uphold any regulation that treated interstate migrants and intrastate
migrants equally if there was a rational basis for the regulation. 109 If
courts adopt this latter rationale, the right to travel will not be of great
importance in challenges to local growth management schemes.
Only one case has specifically addressed the relation of the right
to travel to local growth management efforts. In Construction Industry
Association v. City of Petaluma,'" developers challenged the system
of land use restrictions on several grounds, including the allegation that
the Petaluma Plan violated the right to travel. The Plan was designed
to control the future rate and distribution of growth "'[i]n order to pro-
tect its small town character and surrounding open spaces.' "11
The district court struck down the restrictions on the basis of the
right to travel, saying that Petaluma had failed to prove a compelling
state interest." 2 In adopting the personal liberty view of the right to
travel, the district court wrote:
In essence, the plaintiffs contend that the question of where a
person should live is one within the exclusive realm of the individ-
ual's prerogative, not within the decision-making power of any
governmental unit. Since Petaluma has assumed the power to
make such decisions on the individual's behalf, it is contended that
the city has violated the people's right to travel. Considering -the
facts of the case, we agree." 38
The district court rejected claims of fiscal burden, inadequate water
supply and a preference not to grow as insufficient demonstration of
compelling state interest. 1 4 This opinion was a substantial departure
108. Gleeson, supra note 2, at 72.
109. Id.
110. 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
111. Id. at 576 (quoting the Official Statement of Development Policy for the City
of Petaluma). The Plan consisted of an annual building permit limit of 500 units per
year in projects involving five or more dwelling units, an urban extension line beyond
which the city would not expand for at least twenty years, density limitations, and plans
to limit available facilities. The goal was to limit the 1985 population from a projected
77,000 without growth controls, to a maximum of 55,000 with growth controls.
112. Id. at 586.
113. Id. at 581.
114. In discussing the claim of right to choose not to grow, among the cases cited
with approval in Petaluma were the Pennsylvania regional general welfare cases, includ-
ing Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of Girsh,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965).
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from the rational basis test usually employed by federal courts review-
ing local land use restrictions. 115
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court, dismissing the right to travel claim for lack of standing.",' While
the landowners and construction industry association were able to
satisfy the "injury in fact" test, the court held they did not meet the
"zone of interest" requirement because the right to travel is meant to
protect potential migrants, not developers." 7  The court of appeals
went on to find against plaintiffs on their substantive due process and
commerce clause claims, for which they had standing. Using a rational
basis test, it held that the local restrictions were rationally related to the
permissible governmental objectives of preserving a small town char-
acter and open spaces and of growing at an orderly and deliberate
pace.11
8
While the court of appeals' decision in Petaluma did not reject the
right to travel challenge if brought by a proper plaintiff, two major
hurdles remain for potential migrants who wish to utilize this theory.
First, Warth"19 imposes some fairly stringent requirements for stand-
ing.' 20  Additionally, the court of appeals' use of the rational basis test
in dealing with the other challenges in Petaluma is probably indicative
of the level of review most federal courts would adopt for a right to
travel challenge. The Supreme Court has practiced and encouraged
federal judicial deference to local land use and zoning matters in cases
brought on theories other than the right to travel.12' There is no indi-
cation that higher federal courts are prepared to assume a more rigor-
ous level of judicial scrutiny of local land use controls when the
challenge is based on the right to travel; such a challenge will probably
115. For examples of federal courts using the rational basis test, see Village of Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250
(9th Cir. 1974).
116. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
117. Id. at 904.
118. Id. at 909.
119. See discussion in text accompanying notes 91-94 supra.
120. But there are ways of circumventing the Warth requirements. In Planning For
People Coalition v. County of DuPage, 70 F.R.D. 38 (N.D. II. 1976), plaintiffs were
granted standing without alleging an interest in a specific housing project currently pre-
cluded by the challenged ordinance. Instead, they alleged a conspiracy between county
officials and large developers not to propose any low or moderate income housing proj-
ects.
121. See text accompanying notes 86-94 supra.
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be useful to potential migrants only when local controls penalize inter-
state migration or when local controls are arbitrary and capricious.
Potential migrants seeking to challenge local growth restrictions in
federal courts will probably have to explore other theories for litigation.
A third possible allegation is that the controls are an unconstitutional
violation of equal protection on racial grounds.'22 Since judicial
adoption of either the rational basis test common to equal protection
analysis or the new increased scrutiny of the relationship of means
to ends 23 will usually result in upholding the challenged policy,124 a
challenge is viable -only if plaintiffs can convince courts to in-
yoke the strict scrutiny test, by showing a suspect classification 125 or
a fundamental interest.' 26  If plaintiffs are successful in making this
showing, the ordinance can be upheld only if it is designed precisely
to accomplish the state's purpose, if a less burdensome alternative is not
available, 27 and if the ordinance is necessary to further a compelling
governmental interest.' 28  The government is rarely able to meet this
heavy burden.
129
A potential migrant who is poor or a member of a racial minority
group can avail himself or herself of three possible theories for equal
protection challenges: restriction on access to housing, a fundamental
122. This section is limited to claims of discrimination based on constitutional
grounds. Particular statutes may also provide the basis for litigation when racial dis-
crimination is alleged.
123. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 8-24 (1972); Note, The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A
Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. REv. 1489 (1972).
124. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Gleeson, supra note 2,
at 68.
125. The following have been held to be suspect categories: race, McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971);
ancestry, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947); and possibly when there is a total
deprivation of an important entitlement, wealth, San Antonio Independent School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973).
126. The following have been held to be fundamental interests: the right to procre-
ate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); the right to interstate travel, Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972); the right to personal privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S..113 (1973); the rights
guaranteed by the first amendment, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); and per-
haps, the right to the essential facilities for prosecution of a criminal appeal, Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
127. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
128. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
129. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Dailey v. City of Lawton,
425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna,
436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
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interest; classification according to wealth, a suspect category; and
classification according to race, a suspect category. None of these
theories, however, currently appear to be very promising for use by
potential migrants. The idea that housing is a fundamental interest has
been rejected by the Court.130  Additionally, the Court has limited
wealth as a suspect criterion to situations where an inability to pay for
a desired benefit results in "an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit."''1 An absolute deprivation of lower
cost housing will not be found unless plaintiffs can prove the unavaila-
bility of decent and relatively convenient lower cost housing anywhere
in the region.3 2
The allegation of racial discrimination when predominantly white
suburbs have inhibited or prevented the provision of lower cost housing
has proved slightly more successful. Courts appear to have distin-
guished between passive non-cooperation with and active resistance to
low and moderate income housing projects. The former has been
allowed as long as it is based on "legitimate governmental reasons."'133
Active resistance taking the form of governmental obstruction'3 4 or
elimination'35 of lower income housing occupied primarily by minorities
has been declared invalid racial discrimination. The distinction be-
tween active and passive resistance, however, is not always followed by
the courts.' 3 6
Even when actiVe resistance to lower cost housing can be shown,
plaintiffs have the burden of showing that the classification was racial.
Courts have refused to equate economic discrimination with racial
130. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971).
131. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973).
132. Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974). Note
the similarity between this requirement and the federal variation on the regional general
welfare, discussed in text accompanying notes 95-97 supra.
133. See, e.g., Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir.
1975); Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Hous. Auth., 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974);
Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1974); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos
Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
134. See, e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v.
City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v.
City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
135. Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974).
136. E.g., Metropolitan Hous. & Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517
F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975). This decision was recently
reversed by the Supreme Court, thus resolving the conflict among the courts of appeals.
45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1977).
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discrimination based on the proportion of lower income people belonging
to minority groups1a7 or based on the proportion of minority groups
being of lower income. 13 8 In the past, courts have accepted a showing
of disproportionate racial impact of an ordinance as proof of classifica-
tion according to race." 9 However, -the recent Court decisions of
Washington v. Davis40 and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing & Development Corp.141 rejected a showing of disproportionate
racial impact as sufficient in itself to require an inference of racial dis-
crimination; disproportionate impact is still relevant, but now it must be
accompanied by other facts that taken together prove racially discrim-
inatory intent or purpose on the part of the government. It appears
that this new standard substantially reduces the usefulness of challenges
based on the equal protection clause in the Federal Constitution.
Whether states will adopt similar requirements for proof of racial dis-
crimination when relying on state equal protection clauses remains un-
clear.
A final federal theory on which potential residents may rely is
statutory rather than constitutional. One of the objectives of the Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 1974142 is the spatial decon-
centration of lower income groups.' 43  One of the ways this objective
is to be furthered is by requiring that no grant be made unless preceded
137. E.g., Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
138. Metropolitan Hous. & Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d
409 (7th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1977).
139. See, e.g., Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971) (dic-
tum) (public housing); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971),
aff'd on rehearing en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972) (municipal services); Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (zoning); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization
v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970) (dictum) (zoning); Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968) (urban renewal); Crow
v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 391 '(N.D. Ga. 1971), alf'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972)
(public housing).
140. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976). The Court, footnoting the cases listed in note 139,
supra, wrote:
[V]arious Courts of Appeals have held in several contexts . . . that the sub-
stantially disproportionate racial impact of a statute or official practice stand-
ing alone and without regard to discriminatory purpose, suffices to prove racial
discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause absent some justification
going substantially beyond what would be necessary to validate most other leg-
islative classifications. . . . [To the extent that those cases rested on or ex-
pressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnecessary in
making out an equal protection violation, we are in disagreement.
Id. at 2050.
141. 45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1977).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. V 1975).
143. Id. § 5301(c)(6).
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by an application containing a housing assistance plan144 that surveys
housing conditions and assesses the housing assistance needs of persons
of lower income "residing in or expected to reside in the commu-
nity."'1 45 According to Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) regulations, the "expected to reside" figure refers to
lower income persons and families planning or "expected to reside in
the community as a result of existing or planned employment facili-
ties.' 146  The community is required to set realistic annual goals and
develop a plan for meeting the housing needs. 147  HUD has a duty to
review the "expected to reside" figure and to determine whether the
planned projects are calculated to meet the identified needs. If the
Secretary of HUD finds that the description of needs and objectives is
plainly inconsistent with facts or data, that the proposed projects will
not meet the needs described or that the proposal does not comply with
other requirements, he or she is to disapprove the grant.
48
Statutory requirements may provide a basis for litigation by
potential migrants and by regional residents, such as residents of a cen-
tral city who want to compel the suburbs to accept lower income resi-
dents. In City of Hartford v. Hills,14 plaintiffs (the City of Hartford,
eight city officials and two representatives of a class consisting of minor-
ity, low income persons living in inadequate housing) were given
standing to bring suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against seven
suburbs, the Secretary and other officials of HUD and HUD itself.150
144. Id. § 5304(a)(4).
145. Id. § 5304(a)(4)(A).
146. 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(2).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(a)(1), (a)(4)(B).
148. Id. § 5304(c).
149. 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
150. The city and lower income minority plaintiffs were held to have standing.
Hartford satisfied the zone of interest test since the Act was passed in part to ameliorate
the problems of central cities. Injury in fact was found since it would stand to benefit
financially through disapproval of the challenged grants and reallocation of the funds
with first priority to cities in the same metropolitan area. See 42 U.S.C. § 5306(e)
(Supp. V 1975). The low income minority residents of Hartford satisfied the zone of
interest test because they are the people whom the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974 is supposed to help. Standing was buttressed by their claims of viola-
tion of Title VIII (Fair Housing) of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3631 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d6. They
fulfilled the injury in fact test by a possible loss of benefits of redirected priorities by
the applicant town or loss of benefits from projects implemented by Hartford with reallo-
cated funds.
But see Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on rehearing en banc,
537 F.2d 589 (1976). The district court in Hartford v. Hills cited the first Evans v.
Lynn opinion, which granted standing to similar plaintiffs, as controlling. 408 F. Supp.
at 896 (citing Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d at 574). In the first Evans opinion, low income
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The theory of the suit was that defendants had abused their discretion
in awarding funds under the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974 when statutory standards mandated that the applications
be disapproved. 151 Six of the towns submitted applications with zero
people in need of housing assistance expected to reside, and the
seventh submitted figures based only on the housing authority waiting
list. The district court held that HUD acted contrary to the law when
it approved the six grants and acted arbitrarily when it approved the
seventh. The court enjoined all the towns from spending funds
granted them under the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974.152
There are obvious problems with this strategy, but it may prove
useful in certain situations. HUD is having trouble deciding how to cal-
culate the "expected to reside" figure so it is uncertain for what types
and magnitude of migration towns will be required to prepare. In
addition, a suit would only be successful if the figure submitted and
approved was clearly inconsistent with available data. Moreover, the
only sanction would be withdrawal of specific federal funds; the local
government policies would not be invalidated. Finally, it is unclear
whether this result, particularly the grant of standing, would be avail-
able in other courts.153
D. Summary
There are multiple legal theories potential or regional residents
may invoke to force local residents to adjust their growth management
systems to allow for migration. However, these challenges are only
likely to meet with success in a minority of courts. Since a majority
of the state courts and the federal courts approach land use litigation
minority residents of a county who lived in socially concentrated low income neighbor-
hoods were given standing to challenge grants for sewer and recreation to one of the
county's towns. The claim was that the federal departments violated statutory affirma-
tive action requirements by making grants to municipalities without evaluating the eco-
nomic and racial consequences of their housing and development practices, with the ef-
fect of maintaining racial residential segregation in Westchester County. Since the
Hartford opinion, on rehearing Evans v. Lynn, the majority found a lack of standing,
stating that plaintiffs sustained no injury as a consequence of HUD's actions in making
the grants to the town. 537 F.2d at 589.
151. They also alleged violation of Title VIII (Fair Housing) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d6; constitutional claims under civil rights statutes 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1982 & 1985; and the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution.
152. Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976).
153. See discussion of Evans v. Lynn in note 150 supra.
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from the third stage, "acceptance of local autonomy," intra-metropolitan
migration is not usually considered a process that deserves constitu-
tional protection. There is some indication that this attitude may
change in some states in the future; but in federal courts stiffened
standing requirements combined with a heightened burden of proof
to show racial discrimination signal increased hostility of federal
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to claims of potential migrants
based on constitutional grounds. Perhaps Congress, by providing statu-
tory grounds for litigation by potential migrants, may be able to counter-
balance this hostility and force federal courts to promote the inclusion
of lower income and minority groups in the suburbs.
Prospects for successful constitutional challenges by potential
migrants are much greater in states accepting the second or fourth stage
of judicial review. In the former, suspicion of local government actions
predisposes courts to be receptive to these challenges. In -the sophisti-
cated fourth stage of judicial review, appreciation of the value of intra-
metropolitan migration and the need for a regional perspective account
for the optimism. Even though potential residents may prevail on the
merits in these states, problems remain with the adequacy of the
remedy. Courts tend to resort to numbers games without satisfactory
examination of factors essential to determine optimum migration pat-
terns.
IlI. AN ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW AFFECTING MIGRATION
The law affecting migration is in a very uncertain state. Many
courts appear to have recognized that interferences with residential
patterns through land use controls might have an antisocial effect on
population dynamics. Some of these courts seem to be waiting until the
policy implications of land use law are more adequately explained to act
on this general recognition. Other courts are willing to attempt to grant
relief even though their remedies are crude. The level of judicial per-
formance in both situations might be improved if social scientists, demo-
graphers in particular, could answer two basic questions: (1) Why are
the mechanisms of population growth (i.e., migration) important for
maintaining the general well-being of society? (2) What are the
proper standards with which local governments should comply in formu-




The migration mechanism has drawn much attention from land
use planners because it has been a major element in the metropolitan
explosion of the 1960's and 1970's. Many local governments have
developed the attitude that population growth and structural change are
evil and must be controlled. It follows, they feel, that mechanisms that
produce population growth and structural change are socially destruc-
tive if left uncontrolled. This position needs further exploration. Is
it true that forces like migration must be controlled to preserve the wel-
fare of the community? Does a locality have a right to preserve its wel-
fare at the expense of the region? Does migration have any intrinsic
value to society? If it does, when do legal controls so encumber migra-
tion that they impermissibly prevent the migration mechanism from
making its contribution to the general health of society?
It is the hypothesis of this article that migration does, indeed, have
intrinsic value to society. Growth controls that substantially distort
migration patterns should be applied only as extraordinary measures
after attempts to enable the migration mechanism to operate properly
have failed. In support of this, the Committee on Community Devel-
opment of the Domestic Council recommended that "most of the
time, a competitive, private decision economy that effectively utilizes
the capacity to produce will provide a geographic and functional distri-
bution of people, activities and resources that is more efficient and
more desirable than alternative methods."'1 "
It is generally recognized by demographers that migration, as well
as the other mechanisms of population dynamics, is not in itself
socially evil. Rather, migration is a regulatory mechanism that helps
society adjust to changing socio-economic conditions. The migration
mechanism is important to the well-being of local labor markets. It is
also important in a social sense, as an element in social learning and
cultural assimilation. Sometimes the migration mechanism may mal-
function and produce an undesirable result. The possibility of mal-
function, however, should not negate the fact that the migration
mechanism is a necessary element of our socio-economic institutions
and is worthy of legal protection. Malfunction of the migration
mechanism is a special case and should be dealt with as such.
The migration mechanism draws part of its intrinsic value from its
support of other institutions that are vital to our nation's economic
154. COMMITTEE ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, THE DOMESTIC CoUNcIL, NA-
TIONAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 6 (1974).
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health, particularly labor markets.'55 Specifically, migration is neces-
sary to promote mobility in labor markets. Without migration some
labor markets would experience a shortage of labor while others would
experience a labor glut.' Existing talent could not be matched with
its best opportunity, and overall the economy would suffer a drop in
efficiency. Wage rates would rise in labor-short markets and, assuming
that wage rates resist downward adjustments, unemployment would rise
in markets with a labor surplus. Even though this analysis is very sim-
plistic, it may reflect the typical situation in metropolitan areas in which
suburban economies are flourishing and central city economies are
becoming more depressed.
The migration mechanism is also important for social reasons.
Migration is an important element in the cultural assimilation of minor-
ity groups. 15 If cities become totally populated by minority groups and
suburbs become all white, they will face striking differences in fiscal
capacity, availability of public services and facilities, and quality of
urban infrastructure. It may become increasingly difficult for minori-
ties to accumulate human capital because of the difference in the
quality of formal education and related public services offered in the
two types of political jurisdictions. If land use controls have the effect
of keeping minorities out of suburban jurisdictions and "white flight"
from the cities to the suburbs continues, America runs the risk of
155. For an excellent theoretical discussion of land use law, migration and labor
markets, see Stull, Land Use and Zoning in an Urban Economy, 64 AM. EcoN. REv.
337-48 (1974).
156. See generally J. KAIN, HOUSING SEGREGATION, NEGRO EMPLOYMENT, AND
METROPOLITAN DECENTRALIZATION (1967); Greenwood, Research on Internal Migration
in the United States: A Survey, 13 J. ECON. LITERATURE 397 (1975); Johnson, Should
the Poor Buy No Growth?, in THE No-GRoWTH SOCIETY 165 (M. Olson cd. 1973);
Mishan, Growth and AntiGrowth, What Are the Issues?, CHALLENGE, May-June, 1973,
at 26; Morrison, Use of the Social Security Work History Sample in Studying Metro-
politan Migration, in THE LABOR FORCE: MIGRATION, EARNINGS, AND GROWTH (Bulletin
Y-63 of the National Fertilizer Development Center, Tennessee Valley Authority, Aug.
1973).
157. See generally R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND UsE
REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970s at 47-58 (1973); H. FRANKLIN, D. FALK & A.
LEVIN, supra note 16; J. KAIN & J. QUIGLEY, DISCRIMINATION AND A HETEROGENEOUS
HOUSING STOCK (1974); J. MCCALL, INCOME MOBILITY, SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1973); B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING 85-122 (1972);
Branfman, Cohen & Trubek, Measuring the Invisible Wall: Land Use Controls and Res-
idential Patterns of the Poor, in LAND USE CONTROLS: PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE
REFORM 57 (D. Listokin ed. 1974); Davidoff & Gold, The Supply and Availability of
Land for Housing for Low- and Moderate-Income Families, in id. at 279; Note, The
Use of Zoning Laws to Prevent Poor People from Moving into Suburbia, 16 How. L.J.
351 (1971).
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developing a dual society-one for whites and one for minority groups
-i which the difference in the availability of financial resources
dictates substantial differences in the public contribution to the quality
of life. Thus, in answer to the first basic question, we may say that
the migration mechanism is important for maintaining the general well-
being of society because migration is an adjustment mechanism through
which pressures that tend to produce dual labor markets and dual cul-
tures are dissipated and because migration is an important, supporting
element of a free market system.
As mentioned above, however, there are rare instances in which
the migration mechanism does not contribute to the general welfare.
Sometimes, migration results not from the efficient operation of labor
markets but from a malfunction of the migration mechanism. Occa-
sionally, poor labor market information is at fault. In other instances,
great quantities of persons, perhaps displaced by economic calamity,
are forced into an area that then has more people than its economy can
absorb.
When such a malfunction occurs, population growth controls may
be justified to correct the error. When land use controls are used to
correct the migration mechanism, however, a situation develops in
which a government tries to control a control mechanism-a very tricky
situation indeed. Such policies can cause more harm than good,
especially in major metropolitan areas where land use responsibility is
divided among several jurisdictions. In these cases, growth control in
one jurisdiction forces migrants into neighboring jurisdictions. As a
result migration may be distorted rather than controlled, and the region
as a whole may be worse off than before growth control.
This brings us to the second major issue-the proper standards to
which local governments should conform in formulating growth man-
agement polices that affect migration and population distribution. As
seen above, many courts, notably those in the third stage of develop-
ment, have set very low standards that require only arguable enhance-
ment of the local welfare. 158 Other courts have gone beyond this to
require a regional perspective. However, the standards set by courts
158. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976). In upholding a plan that would result in
a 25% shortfall in needed housing units in 1980 if adopted throughout the region,
the court stated: "It does not necessarily follow, however, that the due process rights
of builders and landowners are violated merely because a local entity exercises in its
own self interest the police power lawfully delegated to it by the state." Id. at 908 (em-
phasis omitted).
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utilizing a regional perspective vary greatly and tend to be described
in phrases that are not based on operational definitions from related
social science disciplines. For example, some courts have stated that
a jurisdiction must accept the population increase dictated by natural
forces; 159 some focus on the jurisdiction's "fair share" of population; 0
some talk in terms of quotas for low income or minority populations;' 0 '
still others refer to the need to grow at the rate dictated by prevailing
market demand."0 2
What do they mean? At present, no one is quite sure. It may
be a good sign, however, that it is impossible to identify one clear stand-
ard. This means that courts will probably be grappling for criteria that
dictate a locality's responsibility to potential migrants for some time.
The opportunity may still be open for demographers and other social
scientists to lead the courts to adopt a rational standard based on empiri-
cal studies. Demographers can recommend a rational population
growth policy that allows enough growth to keep labor markets operat-
ing efficently and the social structure fluid. The recommended growth
control policy should not be a "beggar-thy-neighbor" attempt to force
unwanted growth into neighboring jurisdictions, but rather it should be
a regional, metropolitan approach to economic and community develop-
ment. In sum, demographers can urge courts to balance the negative
effects of a growth management policy on labor markets, minority
group assimilation and regional population structure against any sub-
stantial and irreparable environmental damage or any insurmountable
fiscal disabilities that would be encountered if migration were not con-
trolled.
Beyond this level of general recommendations, however, the
state of the art breaks down; no formulae are available to say precisely
how much freedom to migrate is needed to keep labor markets operat-
ing efficiently and the social structure fluid. A review of current
empirical studies is needed to determine what studies are forthcoming
from demographers that might be of assistance to the courts and what
159. See Steel Hill Dev. Corp. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (lst Cir.
1972); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938); Na-
tional Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
160. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
161. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 128 N.J. Super. 438,
320 A.2d 223 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974). See note 67 supra for an explanation of
the history of the case.
162. See Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D.
Cal. 1974), rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976).
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gaps in the understanding remain that demographers or those in related
fields should seek to fill.
IV. CURRENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES
Empirical research that lends itself to policy analysis in growth
control disputes is in its infancy. The problem has been examined in
the literature of regional and labor economics and in planning circles.
Other disciplines have addressed the problem but their efforts have not
jelled into firm policy recommendations. Since the bulk of this
research was initiated after 1965 as a result of civil rights interest in
housing, employment and education, the greatest achievements to date
are found in the literature measuring the effects of racial discrimina-
tion. There is a great need to duplicate this type of research in all
areas pertinent to growth control.
In confronting the question of the responsibility of local govern-
ments to accommodate migration, the most useful research would
measure the effects of present growth controls on our economic system
and would refine our ability to forecast the economic and demographic
potential for small areas. There has been some progress on both of
these topics, but many crucial questions are still unanswered.
There has been some effort to determine whether metropolitan
housing patterns are related to racial discrimination. These studies
could be generalized to measure the effects of growth control on other
socio-economic groups. The hypothesis might be that if segregated
residential housing patterns are deleterious to the well-being of urban
blacks, similar negative impacts might be experienced by all lower
income people precluded by growth controls from migrating to eco-
nomically integrated residential patterns.
Many United States metropolitan areas have segregated residential
patterns, and the concentration of blacks in central cities may be
increasing. Kain 16 3 and others'6  have found that segregated housing
163. J. KAIN, HOUSING SEGREGATION, NEGRO EMPLOYMENT AND METROPOLITAN
DECENTRALIZATION (1967).
164. See generally E. BERGMAN, ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: RECONCIL-
ING WORKPLACE AND RESIDENCE IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (1974); M. CLAWSON, supra
note 6; J. KAIN & J. QUIGLEY, supra note 157; R. LINEBERRY & I. SHARmANSKY, URBAN
PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1972); J. MCCALL, supra note 157; Crecine, Davis &
Jackson, Urban Property Markets: Some Empirical Results and Their Implications for
Municipal Zoning, 10 J.L. & ECON. 79 (1967); de Leeuw, The Demand for Housing:
A Review of the Cross Section Evidence, 53 REv..ECON & STATISTICS 1 (1971); Strasz-
heim, Housing Market Discrimination & Black Housing Consumption, 1974 Q.J. EcON.
19.
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patterns have a significant inverse correlation with employment oppor-
tunities. In addition, many central cities are losing their employment
base while employment opportunities seem to be expanding in many
suburban communities. Many analysts predict that the black commu-
nity will suffer economic strangulation if it is not allowed to break out
of inner-city ghettos and migrate to suburbs in search of jobs. They
contend that growth control policies are an anathema to intraurban
black migration and must be revoked in order to allow blacks to
advance economically.
This theory has drawn criticism on two fronts. First, it is argued
that blacks have not accumulated sufficient "human capital" (e.g.,
education) to advance to high income jobs and, even if they lived in
the suburbs they would not have enough skill and training to find
employment in the "white collar" industries located there.10a Because
of low levels of human capital, blacks and other low-income people
would not be able to increase their income by moving to the suburban
areas and, in fact, they might be forced to commute back into the city
to find work. Thus, according to theorists using strictly income
measures, blacks and other lower-income minorities would not be
helped by easing growth controls.
Second, some analysts argue that labor market discrimination, not
housing discrimination, is the major factor explaining racial income dif-
ferentials. This school of thought argues that reducing residential
segregation will not reduce labor-market discrimination and black
socio-economic status will be unchanged. 16 6 One analyst summarizing
empirical studies wrote:
Our basic conclusion is that we have found no support for the
hypothesis that housing segregation, together with the suburbaniza-
tion of jobs, have had a significant effect on the black-white income
ratio. . . . [T]wo obvious possibilities are (1) Noll's hypothesis
that central city labor markets are tighter than suburban areas, and
(2) the hypothesis that blacks can find suburban jobs without
undue difficulty when such jobs are available. 167
Kain's thesis about the negative correlation between segregated
housing patterns and employment opportunities might be reconciled
with these findings by admitting the correlation but positing a causal
165. See generally J. KAIN & J. QUIGLEY, supra note 157; J. MCCALL, supra note
157.
166. For an excellent survey of empirical studies in this area, see S. MASTERS,
BLAcK-WHrrE INCOME DiFFERENTIALS (1975).
167. Id. at 50.
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factor other than geographic separation. One might reason that if
blacks are crowded into fiscally weak inner city ghettos, the lack of
quality education and related services will foreclose any opportunity to
accumulate sufficient human capital to qualify for employment in
suburban industries, assuming that suburban employment requires a
higher level of skills. Thus, whether or not suburban communities
were closed to migration by locally imposed growth controls would have
little impact on these people.
Society has tried to combat this residential location barrier to
human capital accumulation by busing school children in urban jurisdic-
tions, but busing may be ineffective in situations where the entire juris-
diction is incapable of contributing -to human capital formation. More-
over, it may well be that a remedy aimed at improving formal education
cannot overcome the disadvantages of living in a ghetto.
One problem is that low paying jobs and low income people are
crowded into central cities. One theorist writes:
The most important feature of an economy in which discrimination
is practiced is the simple fact that some jobs are open to Negroes
and some are not. The jobs open to Negroes are not a random
selection, even allowing for Negroes' relatively lower education.
They tend to be predominantly low in status and to be concentrated
very heavily in a few occupations. 168
Housing segregation may compound the effect by maintaining the status
quo by keeping industries that would provide employment to lower
income minority groups out of suburban locations where such workers
are unavailable. Thus, housing segregation may be a device by which
our society obscures and justifies labor market discrimination.
The housing discrimination literature suggests that demographers
and other social scientists can assist in public policy formulation. If
they can relate migration to human capital formulation, employment
growth and income, population growth controls can be evaluated as to
whether they harm low income, minority groups or the overall effici-
ency of our economy. There have been some recent attempts to esti-
mate these interrelationships. 6 A number of analysts have made
progress on this front by using a simultaneous equations approach.17
0
168. Id. at 10 (quoting Bergmann, The Effect on .White Incomes of Discrimination
in Employment, 79 J. POLTCAL ECON. 294 (1971)).
169. See Greenwood, Research on Internal Migration in the United States: A Sur-
vey, 13 J. ECON. LITERATURE 397 (1975), for a summary of these recent attempts.
170. See id. at 418-21.
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Most of this analysis, however, has explored the mutual dependence of
employment growth and migration. Work needs to be done to relate
migration to income and human capital formation, as well as to employ-
ment growth. Also, the effects of differential racial factors on these
relationships should be explored, and if the effects cannot be explained
by normal economic analysis, social scientists should try to convince
courts that population growth controls should be modified to correct
these inequities. 17
1
Another crucial area for research is the estimation of population
growth potential for small areas. It is curious that while many have
labored in small area population estimation, few have achieved any
meaningful results. In fact, -the area may be over-researched by naive
investigators who are willing to predict population change on the basis
of any data compatible with their regression package. 172  This is an
area in which we need fewer numbers and more thought.
To advance the state of the art in small area population estimation
and projection, social scientists must develop better data bases, especi-
ally with respect to migration. They must also develop a structural
equation methodology to relate population growth to the major ele-
ments of national, regional and local economics.
An interesting experiment to develop small area data bases for
analysing intra-SMSA population dynamics is being performed at the
Washington, D. C. Center for Metropolitan Studies. In its periodical,
Trends Alert, the Center publishes the results of its mini-census survey.
The process has been rewarding in measuring the center city/suburban
population dynamics in the Washington area. Hopefully, the experi-
ment will be duplicated in other areas and will result in solid data bases
for modeling purposes.
The prevailing methodology for linking local population growth to
state and national socio-economic trends is shift-share analysis. The
forecasting done by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the United
States Department of Commerce is a good example of shift-share
methodology. Basically, the trends in an area's share of state, regional
and national growth is calculated and adjusted to conform to national
economic and population projections. This technique has been useful
171. But see discussion of Washington v. Davis and Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing & Dev. Corp. in text accompanying notes 140 & 141, supra.
172. One of the writers had the experience recently of trying to advise a local juris-
diction of a proposed growth control policy on the basis of eight independently estimated
and contradictory population projections for that county.
[Vol. 55
LOCAL GROWTH MANAGEMENT
and enlightening but it is basically a descriptive analysis. It cannot pre-
dict turning points or answer any of the important questions about
causation.
Social scientists must develop a more analytical approach than
shift-share analysis if they are going to shed much light on intra-SMSA
population change. In arguing that a simultaneous equations approach
is the logical way to approach this problem, one theorist concludes:
[S]uch an approach has not yet been [taken] in a regional, policy
oriented context. Because -the local public sector is largely endog-
enous to migration, and because many of the policy impacts of
higher levels of government are likely to be exerted through the
local public sector, the local public sector should be included as
an important component in a policy-oriented model of national
population redistribution.173
A review of current empirical studies shows an attempt to relate
the components of population change, especially migration, to socio-
economic forces. Only recently, however, have migration analysts dis-
cussed their topic in a way that lends itself to policy application in local
growth control litigation.. Much work needs to be done to improve data
collection and methodology for small area demographic analysis and
projection. Until that time, courts in the third stage of evolution'
74 will
be able to justify ignoring the impact of growth controls on potential
residents, and courts in the fourth stage of evolution' 5 will have to
continue to grope in the dark or use crude models of intra-urban
relationships as they search for an appropriate resolution of growth
control controversies involving direct or indirect limitations on migration.
V. CONCLUSION
Many of the increasingly prevalent local efforts to manage growth
are likely to put constraints on migration through direct or indirect
controls. There are several theories through which potential migrants
can challenge these growth controls, including regional general welfare,
racial or economic equal protection, right to travel and statutory claims.
The prognosis for a successful challenge depends on whether the claim is
based on federal or state constitutional or statutory grounds and the
state in which the action is brought.
173. Greenwood, supra note 169, at 442.
174. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
175. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
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In courts adopting the current majority attitude of "faith in local
autonomy," a local government will probably be able to have its growth
management system sustained against a challenge by potential resi-
dents. Little weight will be given to the claims of harm to potential
migrants. In courts taking either a stage two approach requiring the local
government to defend the restriction, or a stage four approach, sophisti-
cated judicial review, potential migrants will have a greatly increased
chance of success. Such courts are more likely to hold that a local
government has a regional responsibility that includes the accommoda-
tion of a certain number of migrants in the region. Even in courts most
protective of the rights of potential residents and most impressed with
the need to avoid exclusionary residential patterns, however, the
analysis is largely uninformed by an in-depth understanding of the
migration mechanism and its relationship to income differentials,
human capital formation and employment growth. The remedies show
a parallel lack of sensitivity to these factors.
The failure to consider these factors in judicial decisionmaking
may be due, in part, to constraints on a court's ability to engage in
extensive socio-economic impact analysis and to practical limits on
remedies it may award. It is also due, however, to the shortcomings
in the data base, theories and methodologies that social scientists have
been able to develop to deal with these questions. While recent efforts
to improve simultaneous equations techniques to relate migration to the
dynamics of the economic system are promising, much work needs to
be done by social scientists in order to provide local decisionmakers and
courts with knowledge on which to evaluate local constraints on
migration.
The following is a preliminary list of the questions that need to
be answered in order to gain a better understanding of the relationship
of migration to local land use controls. A general analytic approach
is suggested after each question in the hope that demographers and
social scientists will be inspired to continue the research and quantifica-
tion process.
A. Why is migration important enough to merit legal protection?
Migration is an adjustment mechanism that helps keep the social system
fluid and the economic system efficient. In order to argue that migra-
tion is worthy of legal protection, one must quantify the relationship




B. When is population growth through net in-migration effici-
cient? In any growth area, net in-migration and attendant population
growth is judged by a variety of efficiency yardsticks. The private and
societal economic benefit/cost ratio must be considered. Additionally,
substantial long-run environmental impacts -that are not part of the
benefit/cost calculation should be considered. Another, and perhaps
the best, test of migration efficiency is whether migration facilitates the
Pareto efficiency of the economic system.
C. When does population growth through net in-migration
contribute to social progress? Migration is a key mechanism for a
melting pot society. Not only does migration match job skills with labor
demand but it also facilitates a form of social learning that is necessary
if society is to grow and function with an acceptable degree of unity
and coherence. One must quantify whether migration actually pro-
motes this unity among groups.
D. When should net in-migration be controlled? It is conceiv-
able that growth mechanisms, acting partly through migration, could
malfunction to the detriment of economic efficiency and social progress.
Inefficient growth could occur through imperfect labor market informa-
tion or by a distortion of normal processes brought about by outside
interference with the mechanism, such as zoning laws, taxation policy or
discrimination. Also, the migration mechanism may not take into con-
sideration all the social costs and long-run environmental impact of
growth and thereby produce a suboptimal social result. One could con-
struct a solid argument for controlling population growth and movement
when any of these factors are present, if there are techniques for
measuring the divergence between the result produced by a malfunc-
tioning migration mechanism and the optimal social result.
E. How should population growth and net in-migration be
controlled? Only abberations of population growth mechanisms should
be controlled. Too often growth control law is heavy-handed, ignoring
the positive aspects of growth. In controlling population growth
mechanisms through legal intervention, one should be very careful not
to retard economic efficiency or social progress.
F. What is the proper paradigm for migration and growth?
Population growth or decline is the result of natural processes, a major
element of which is the migration mechanism. In many ways, the
migration mechanism is analogous to the price mechanism and as such,
it should be studied in terms of its value as a control mechanism. Too
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often lawyers regard population growth as an immutable, natural force
and formulate the law in terms of quotas designed to apportion popula-
tion growth to its natural place of residence. Migration, however, is
really only one of a set of interlocking, simultaneously determined
relationships that bind the economic system together. Migration is an
adjustment mechanism that has value only insofar as it functions
smoothly with other mechanisms to produce optimal socio-economic
results.
G. How does one quantify the "fair share" of population to be
accommodated by a region? Instead of formulating a population quota
system, a region should be required to absorb as much population
growth as is necessary to keep the socio-economic system operating
efficiently. In other words, the focus of attention should shift from the
numbers game characteristic of past litigation to a thorough considera-
tion of how migration interacts with other elements of the socio-
economic system. This exercise requires simultaneous consideration of
many factors, and the ultimate test should be whether the system as a
whole is producing socially optimal results.
H. Which geographic area is -the proper unit of analysis? Be-
cause the socio-economic system is sensitive to national, regional and
local influences, it is difficult to constrain an analysis to a particular geo-
graphic entity. The fault of many past growth control laws has been
-that they focused on too small an area. The result was, of course,
parochial and anti-social when considered in a broader context. Pres-
ently, there is a push to regionalism. The region is a more appropriate
geographic unit for analysis. But a question remains as to the proper
definition of a region for population growth control purposes. It may
be a State Economic Area, a labor market, a housing market or some
other unit. The elusive nature of regionalism is a major problem con-
fronting any research dealing with population growth and redistribution.
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